On the corner of Ukrainian Independence Street in Riga – Ukrainas Neatkarības iela in Latvian – sits a building bathed in fading pastels, adorned with barbed wire and barred windows. This is the Russian Embassy to Latvia, guarded around the clock by the Latvian State Police and cordoned off with black rope that passersby are careful not to cross. Sticking out from seemingly every corner of the building’s edifice are security cameras, trained on anyone who dares to glance in the embassy’s vicinity. Inside there are no lights on, only the solitary glow of white, blue, and red LEDs mounted above a peeling Federation seal. From across the street, affixed to the wall of the Pauls Stradiņš Museum of Medical History, Kriss Salmanis’ Death’s Head stares down this small outpost of Moscow in Riga. The piece – a massive black-and-white portrait of Vladimir Putin, his face grotesquely distorted, mouth bristling with monstrous teeth, skin sagging around hollow eyes and a sunken jaw like a figure out of the undead, all set against a stark blood-red background – confronts the few remaining employees still stationed within the embassy. Nearby, dozens of Ukrainian flags whip in the wind. A toilet sits provocatively aimed at the embassy, beside an unsettling installation depicting Putin hanging from a noose – a grim symbol of protest and defiance. Still, a tattered banner of the Russian Federation flutters atop the embassy – weathered but defiant – a quiet signal that, despite appearances, the mission endures.

After Russia began its full scale invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022, Latvia significantly narrowed its diplomatic relations with Moscow, directly affecting the functionality of the Russian Embassy in Riga.1 (see the list of references) On March 18th, 2022, Latvian Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkēvičs declared three Russian Embassy staff members personae non gratae, citing their “activities under diplomatic cover” as incompatible with their status and harmful to Latvia, due to their alleged role in planning and supporting Russian aggression in Ukraine.2 A few months later, on January 23rd, 2023, Russian Ambassador Mikhail Vanin was summoned to Latvia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and informed of the government’s decision to downgrade its diplomatic representation in Russia to the level of chargé d’affaires – a standard practice between states with strained diplomatic relations.3 The following day, the Russian Ambassador to Latvia was ordered out of the country, just as Latvia relieved Ambassador Māris Riekstiņš from his post in Moscow.4 The move came just days after Estonia requested a reduction in the number of employees at the Russian Embassy in Tallinn, thus prompting the expulsion of Estonia’s Ambassador to Russia, Margus Laidre, from Moscow.5 Previously, officials in Vilnius expelled the Russian Ambassador to Lithuania after hundreds were slaughtered in the Ukrainian town of Bucha in April 2022.6 The UN went on to classify the actions of the Russian Federation in Bucha as war crimes.7

While all three Baltic States have downgraded their diplomatic ties with Russia since 2022, none have fully severed relations with Moscow in the wake of its aggression in Ukraine. As such, both the Russian Embassy in Riga along with the Latvian Embassy in Moscow remain open, although their operations remain a shadow of what they were before the war. Although it stands unclear the exact number of Russian diplomats working in the Riga embassy prior to the invasion of Ukraine, it is crucial to note that in 2022 alone, Latvia expelled 16 citizens of Russia who had been working for the Russian diplomatic and consular mission in Latvia.8 Today, there remain 4 Russian diplomats working at Ukrainas Neatkarības iela 2, per official publication by the Russian Embassy in Latvia, although these numbers cannot be confirmed by the Latvian government under the regulations of the Vienna Convention.9

Belarus, Russia’s coconspirator, long ago abandoned standard diplomatic relations with Latvia. The Belarusian Embassy in Riga has been closed since 2021 – well before the invasion of Ukraine. In June of 2021, Riga hosted the World Ice Hockey Championship, just a few weeks after Belarusian officials forced a Vilnius-bound Ryanair plane to land in Minsk and proceeded to arrest two opposition activists who were onboard.10 In response to the detention of the Belarusian activists, Riga Mayor Mārtiņš Staķis and the Latvian Foreign Minister replaced the official Belarusian flag with the historical white-red-white version in the display of national flags at the World Ice Hockey Championship. The following week, Latvian Ambassador to Belarus Einārs Semanis was summoned to the Belarusian Foreign Ministry and informed that diplomats and staff of the Latvian Embassy in Minsk had been ordered to leave the country. In response to the actions of Belarus, the Latvian Foreign Ministry summoned the Belarusian chargé d’affaires ad interim to inform them of the identical action and the expulsion of Belarusian diplomats.11 Four years later, the Belarusian Embassy in Riga remains shut down, while Latvia’s Embassy in Minsk remains functioning with severe limitations.12 To date, Belarus maintains its embassies in Vilnius and Tallinn, and both Lithuania and Estonia have kept their embassies in Minsk open.13

Despite protests from within the country, the Latvian government has opted to keep its embassy in Moscow open, even as the Russian government ordered the closure of the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian consulates in St. Petersburg and Pskov in April 2022, citing the Baltics’ support for the “Kyiv regime” and “Ukrainian nationalist crimes against the civilian populations of Donbas and Ukraine.”14 In turn, the Latvian Embassy in Moscow is working at limited capacity – but with major concerns surrounding the security and safety of its personnel. In a statement to the Baltic Security Foundation in July 2025, the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintains that, “At present, the Embassy of Latvia in Russia serves as the sole diplomatic channel from the Latvian side between the two countries. Through this channel, Latvia is able to provide consular assistance to its citizens in Russia and maintain essential working-level communication between institutions to resolve matters important to Latvia.” Moreover, the Ministry notes that, “the Consular section of the Embassy of the Republic of Latvia in Moscow offers support to Latvian nationals in Russia who have been detained, are hospitalized, or find themselves in other emergency situations.”15 Were Latvia to close Russia’s embassy in Riga, the Ministry argues, it is highly probable that the Russian government would reciprocate by shutting down Latvia’s embassy in Moscow, thereby leaving Latvian nationals in Russia stranded in an aggressor state without crucial support.16

That said, some, such as Sandis Šrāders, a research fellow at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs and lecturer in Russian military and strategic studies at the Baltic Defence College, remain unconvinced by the Ministry’s rationale. Since the onset of the war in Ukraine, Šrāders has long maintained that the Latvian government should order the immediate closure of the Russian Embassy in Riga to limit the country’s coercive and destabilizing activities in Latvia. He also supports shutting down the Latvian Embassy in Moscow. Šrāders contends that, given Russia’s classification as a terrorist state by Latvia and the European Union (EU), diplomatic relations between Riga and Moscow are not possible until all territories occupied by Russia are liberated.17

Further, Šrāders notes, keeping the Russian Embassy in Riga along with the Latvian Embassy in Moscow open serves only as a national security risk to Latvia. Currently, he argues, the only purpose of the Russian Embassy is to gather intelligence and deliver information about Latvia to be reported back to Moscow. As a small nation – especially relative to Russia in both size and population – Latvia is at a disadvantage when it comes to intelligence capabilities. As Šrāders has observed, “larger countries have more sophisticated information about the region to which a small country belongs, than the small regional country itself. There is little doubt that more informed states tend to utilize their intelligence advantages,” adding further that, “In terms of international interaction, Latvia is far from adapted.”18 As such, Šrāders argues that Latvia must immediately expel all Russian diplomats and close the embassy in Riga to prevent espionage and restrict Russian spy activities. He concedes that if Latvia were to shut down the Russian Embassy, it would likely provoke a hostile reaction from Moscow, including the immediate closure of the Latvian Embassy in Russia. However, he argues that this would be a long-term win for Latvia, reducing Russia’s political leverage. Regarding the safety of Latvian citizens in Russia, Šrāders notes that the Latvian government has strongly advised its citizens residing in Russia to leave as soon as possible and urged others to cancel all travel plans to Russia and Belarus. He suggests that those who choose to remain despite these warnings are, knowingly or unknowingly, aligning themselves with the Russian regime. In other words, Latvians still in Russia or Belarus are making a difficult choice about where they stand.19

The ongoing debate over the importance of retaining diplomatic relations with Russia remains highly salient in the Baltics, especially when broader strategic considerations are taken into account. Last year, the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Russia’s chargé d’affaires pro tempore Dmitry Kasatkin after a Russian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) crashed in the Rezekne region on September 7th. Preliminary data indicated that it was a military UAV of the Russian Federation which had entered Latvian airspace from Belarus. Later, the National Armed Forces announced that the drone was equipped with an explosive device. Kasatkin denied that the drone belonged to Russians or Russia.20 In June, the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the chargé d’affaires of the Embassy of the Russian Federation to protest and deliver an official note regarding a violation of Estonia’s airspace. Estonian officials report that a Russian aircraft entered Estonian airspace near the island of Vaindloo on June 22nd, where it remained without permission for approximately four minutes.21

All of this unfolds against the backdrop of ongoing Russian espionage activities in the Baltics, including the severing of eleven undersea cables in the Baltic Sea and the orchestrated use of illegal migration – facilitated by both Russia and Belarus – as a tool to destabilize Baltic governments and strain NATO and EU cohesion.22 The governments of all three Baltic States have also expressed alarm over Russian disinformation efforts and the deployment of operatives on the ground engaging in covert activities within their territories.23At the same time, the Baltics anxiously await Zapad 2025 – the joint military exercise between Moscow and Minsk – set to take place in Belarus this September. The last Zapad exercise, in 2021, preceded Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.24 As past Zapad iterations have brought tens of thousands of troops close to the borders of Poland and the Baltic States, the interior ministers of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are currently collaborating to develop mass evacuation plans, with Vilnius set to conduct related drills this fall.25

In addition to international political considerations, Latvia must carefully manage the domestic dimension of its Russia policy, given the presence of its sizable Russian-speaking population. Latvia is 25.6% ethnic Russian, with a larger percentage – 34.6% – of Latvians speaking Russian within the home.26 Moreover, of the quarter of Latvia’s population that is ethnically Russian, one-third do not have Latvian citizenship.27 This reality, combined with Latvia’s recent efforts to expel residents of Russian origin who cannot demonstrate Latvian proficiency, alongside calls to restrict Russian-language media, have heightened political tensions and renewed debates over integration, identity, and national cohesion.28 These challenges are especially pronounced in Riga, where Russians make up nearly half the city’s population.29 As such, it is crucial to note that opinions on the invasion of Ukraine tend to divide somewhat along ethnic lines. Among Latvian speakers, at least 80% place the blame for the war on Russia. Among Russian speakers, that number is around 35%.30

For now, the Baltics can only wait to see what the future holds. In line with the Latvian government’s growing preparedness for conflict, Salmanis joined the Latvian National Guard after the invasion of Ukraine, ready to take part in resistance if necessary. Still, he hopes his poster serves as a reminder to support Ukraine: “Because I don’t want to go to war myself, and I don’t want my daughters to have to emigrate if Russia is allowed to prevail and move on.” Until that moment comes, he says, recent events have “made me even more aware how fantastic it is to live in a peaceful, free country where we can focus on creation, not destruction.”

Salmanis’ Death’s Head will, for now, continue to face the Russian Embassy, quietly confronting it each day. Yet, as he puts it, he “cannot wait for the time when the thing will be brought down.” As for the embassy staff who pass it daily, Salmanis is blunt: “I could not care less what they think. Russia has made itself irrelevant.”31

References

1 LETA, “Latvia Considers Shutting Down Russian Embassy: What Political Consequences Could This Cause?”, BNN News (Baltic News Network), August 6, 2024, online edition, https://bnn-news.com/latvia-considers-shutting-down-russian-embassy-what-political-consequences-could-this-caus e-259524 bnn-news.com.

2 LSM (Latvian Public Broadcasting), “Latvia Expels Three Russian Diplomats,” eng.lsm.lv, March 18, 2022, 15:04, https://eng.lsm.lv/article/politics/diplomacy/latvia-expels-three-russian-diplomats.a448540/.

3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, “Latvia Lowers Level of Diplomatic Relations with the Russian Federation,” January 23, 2023, https://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/article/latvia-lowers-level-diplomatic-relations-russian-federation.

4 Matīss Arnicāns, “Latvia Was Not Prepared to Send New Ambassador to Russia: LTV’s De Facto,” eng.lsm.lv, January 30, 2023

5 Arnicāns, “Latvia Was Not Prepared.”

6 Le Monde, “Russia, Estonia Expel Ambassadors in Tit-for-Tat Move,” Le Monde, January 23, 2023, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/01/23/russia-estonia-expel-ambassadors-in-tit-for-tat-move_60 12718_4.html.

7 UN News, “UN Suspends Russia from Human Rights Council over Ukraine Abuses,” UN News, April 7, 2022, https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115482.

8 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, Annual Report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the Activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2022, April 2023, https://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/media/7965/download?attachment#:~:text=The%20Latvian%20Embassy%20in%20Russ ia,can%20continue%20their%20professional%20activities.

9 Embassy of the Russian Federation in Latvia, “Diplomatic Staff,” accessed July 8, 2025, https://latvia.mid.ru/en/embassy/members/.

10 BNS, “Three Belarusians Named Suspects in 2021 Ryanair Plane Grounding Case,” LRT English, September 6, 2024, https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/2354291/three-belarusians-named-suspects-in-2021-ryanair-plane-groundin g-case. en.wikipedia.org+12lrt.lt+12aviation24.be+12

11 Elmārs Barkāns, “FOTOREPORTĀŽA: kā izskatās visu pamestā Baltkrievijas vēstniecība Rīgā,” Jauns.lv, June 1, 2021, 11:02, https://jauns.lv/raksts/zinas/445899-fotoreportaza-ka-izskatas-visu‑pamesta‑baltkrievijas‑vestnieciba‑riga.

12 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, “Belarus,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, accessed July 9, 2025, https://www2.mfa.gov.lv/en/belarus.

13 Embassy of the Republic of Belarus to the Republic of Latvia, “Contacts,” accessed July 10, 2025, https://latvia.mfa.gov.by/en/embassy/.

14 Latvian Public Broadcasting, “Baltics Requested to Close Consulates in Russia,” eng.lsm.lv, April 21, 2022, https://eng.lsm.lv/article/politics/diplomacy/baltics-requested-to-close-consulates-in-russia.a453331/.

15 Communications Group, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, email to the author, July 9, 2025.

16 Baltic News Network, “Latvia Considers Shutting Down Russian Embassy.”

17 Baltic News Network, “Latvia Considers Shutting Down Russian Embassy.”

18 Sandis Šrāders, The Little Lady that Could: Small Latvia Rejoins the Euro‑Atlantic Community (PhD diss., Old Dominion University, Spring 2017), DOI: 10.25777/h8f1‑sm87

19 Sandis Šrāders (Research Fellow, Latvian Institute of International Affairs; Lecturer in Russian Military and Strategic Studies, Baltic Defence College), phone interview with the author, July 8, 2025.

20 Latvian Public Broadcasting, “Russian Diplomat Presented with Protest Note over Drone Incursion,” eng.lsm.lv, September 9, 2024, https://eng.lsm.lv/article/politics/diplomacy/09.09.2024-russian-diplomat-presented-with-protest-note-over-drone-in cursion.a568010/.

21 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia, “Ministry of Foreign Affairs Summons Russian chargé d’affaires over Airspace Violation,” vm.ee, June 25, 2025, https://www.vm.ee/en/news/ministry-foreign-affairs-summons-russian-charge-daffaires-over-airspace-violation.

22 BNS, “Eleven Damaged Cables in 15 Months: What Is Happening in Baltic Sea?,” LRT English, January 30, 2025, https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/2472575/eleven-damaged-cables-in-15-months-what-is-happening-in-baltic -sea.

23 Deborah Cole, “Beware Unkempt Tourists: Latvia Tells Citizens How to Spot Russian Spies,” The Guardian, May 15, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/may/15/latvia-shares-spy-spotting-guide-to-help-public-expose-russian-sa boteurs. 24 AFP, “Lithuania’s Capital City Unveils War Evacuation Plan Amid Fears of Russian Aggression,” The Moscow Times, April 23, 2025, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/04/23/lithuanias-capital-city-unveils-war-evacuation-plan-amid-fears-of-rus sian-aggression-a88849.

25 Giedrė Peseckytė, “Baltic Countries Team Up on Mass Evacuation Plans as Russian Threat Grows,” Politico, June 13, 2025, https://www.politico.eu/article/baltics-cross-border-evacuation-russia-lithuania-latvia-estonia-ukraine-military-eu/. e

26 LSM.lv – Latvian Public Broadcasting, “Latvian Is the Mother Tongue of 64% of the Population of Latvia,” LSM.lv, October 24, 2023, https://eng.lsm.lv/article/society/society/24.10.2023-latvian-is-the-mother-tongue-of-64-of-the-population-of-latvia.a 528983/.

27 Latvia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Society Integration in Latvia,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, accessed July 10, 2025, https://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/society-integration-latvia#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20data%20in,of%20the%20 Republic%20of%20Latvia.

28 Marija Andrejeva, “‘Express Your Loyalty’: Russian Speakers In Latvia Face Language Test — Or Deportation,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 16, 2024, accessed July 10, 2025, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-latvia-residents-deportation/33116047.html.

29 Minority Rights Group International, “Russians in Latvia,” Minority Rights (updated March 2018), accessed July 10, 2025, https://minorityrights.org/communities/russians-4/.

30 Andrejeva, “‘Express Your Loyalty’.”

31 Krišs Salmanis, email message to author, July 5, 2025.

Cover photo: Olevs Nikers

** by[Grace Zagoria]**