On May 4, 1990, the Republic of Latvia declared its independence from the Soviet Union, ending fifty years of occupation that began in 1940. Similarly, Lithuania and Estonia celebrated the 35th anniversary of their independence restoration in 2025 - Lithuania on March 11 and Estonia on March 30. As the Baltic States mark over three decades of sovereignty following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it becomes essential to analyze their evolving relationship with the Russian Federation, the Soviet Union’s successor state. Despite each Baltic nation possessing a unique historical trajectory, their experiences share many parallels, particularly in how they have navigated their relations with their former occupier.

1990-1994

The relationship between the Baltic States and Russia has been marked by considerable tension since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Following the declaration of independence, the Baltic States were confronted with the presence of Soviet military forces who remained including personnel at the strategically significant skrunda-1 radar station. Estonia had between 12,000 and 14,000 Russian soldiers, and Lithuania was home to approximately 20,000 to 22,000 Soviet military personnel.¹ These forces remained stationed in the Baltic states until 1994, despite the official declarations of independence.

The withdrawal of Russian forces from the Baltic States occurred gradually, with Lithuania seeing the final pullout in 1993, followed by Estonia and Latvia in 1994. This marked a significant moment in the post-Soviet transition¹, signaling the definitive end of Russian military influence in the region. In the aftermath of this withdrawal, the Baltic States increasingly focused on consolidating their independence and reinforcing their commitment to Western integration, particularly regarding joining European institutions and securing membership in NATO.

Despite the official end of Soviet military presence, Russia continued to assert influence over the region, especially through its criticism of the treatment of ethnic Russians of various international organizations, including the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Baltic Sea States. These appeals often framed the situation in the Baltics as a human rights crisis², with exaggerated claims that policies towards Russians were akin to apartheid or that there had been instances of genocide.

The citizenship policies implemented by the Baltic States became a central focus of these criticisms. Lithuania, in contrast to its Baltic counterparts, granted automatic citizenship to nearly all residents, including ethnic Russians. However, Estonia and Latvia required passing a language proficiency test in the national language and apply for naturalization.² Russia utilized these differences as a key point in its diplomatic efforts, accusing the Baltic States of marginalizing ethnic Russians and creating a “second-class” status for them. While these tensions were particularly pronounced in Latvia and Estonia due to the larger Russian-speaking populations, Lithuania also faced criticism, albeit to a lesser extent, due to its smaller Russian demographic. Russia’s criticisms of these citizenship policies have continued to fuel diplomatic friction between the two sides, and the issue remains a point of contention.

1995-2004

Between 1995 and 2004, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia continued to navigate complex diplomatic terrain in their relationships with the Russian Federation. This period was marked by the post-Soviet transition, the Baltic states’ pursuit of Euro-Atlantic integration, and Russia’s attempts to maintain regional influence. While each Baltic state faced unique bilateral challenges, common threads included disputes over border treatment, continued tensions surrounding Russian-speaking minorities, and geopolitical friction stemming from NATO and EU enlargement.

Following the withdrawal of Russian troops in 1994, Latvia formalized its strategic orientation, the Foreign Policy Concept for 1995-2005.This identified EU and NATO membership as national priorities, alongside the pursuit of normalized relations with Russia.By 1997, Latvia and Russia had drafted a border treaty, including the Abrene region² annexed by the Soviet Union. While the Latvian government approved the draft in December 1997, Russia withheld its signature, leveraging the treaty to obstruct Latvia’s NATO and EU accession. ²

Throughout the late 1990s, the Russian government and state-affiliated media consistently criticized Latvia’s treatment of its Russian-speaking population. Tensions peaked in 1998 with a bombing near the Russian embassy in Riga, which Russian authorities attributed to rising Latvian nationalism.² Annual commemorations of the Latvian Legionnaires and reforms to minority education became hot points in Russia’s efforts to delegitimize Latvia internationally.Between 1998 and 2004, Latvian-Russian relations stagnated, with Russia making periodic attempts to stir internal dissent and delay Latvia’s Western integration. Upon Latvia’s addition to NATO and the EU in 2004, Moscow effectively deprioritized bilateral relations.

Estonia’s post-Soviet relations with Russia were similarly characterized by unresolved historical legacies and political trajectory. The withdrawal of Russian forces by 1994 did not settle underlying disputes, particularly concerning border demarcation and the rights of Estonia’s large Russian-speaking minority.

Although a border treaty was initiated in 1996, it was never ratified due to disagreements over Estonia’s reference to legal continuity from its pre-World War 2 independence. Russia viewed this language as a rejection of Soviet legitimacy and used it as justification to delay ratification indefinitely.³

Estonia’s requirement for language proficiency and loyalty oaths as prerequisites for citizenship became a focal point of Russian critique, with Moscow framing these laws as discriminatory. Russian media increasingly portrayed Estonia as a Russophobic state, with these narratives laying the groundwork for more aggressive cyber and disinformation campaigns in subsequent years.

Lithuania’s tensions with Russia were less ethnopolitical and more logistical and economic. Despite having a smaller Russian-speaking population, Lithuania’s strategic location positioned it at the center of key transit and energy disputes. Lithuania’s insistence on EU visa standards during accession negotiations clashed with Russian demands for unhindered transit to and from Kaliningrad.⁴ The compromise was a special facilitated travel document system, which, while accepted, added friction to bilateral ties. During this time, Lithuania also pursued energy diversification strategies and began investing in Western energy infrastructure and reducing reliance on Russian pipelines.⁴

By 2004, Lithuania emerged as one of the most vocal post-Soviet critics of Russian foreign policy. Its accession to NATO and the EU, like Latvia and Estonia, was viewed by Russia as a strategic loss. However, Lithuania’s firm commitment to transatlantic institutions allowed it to assert a distinct foreign policy identity.

2005-2015

Between 2005 and 2015, relations between the Baltic states and the Russian Federation transformed from cautious coexistence to open confrontation. This period began with modest efforts at institutional engagement and culminated in stark geopolitical realignment.

Following Latvia’s accession to NATO and the EU, Russia adopted a posture of “strategic indifference” toward bilateral ties. While Latvia emphasized multilateral cooperation through frameworks like the Council of the Baltic States, Russia viewed such institutions primarily as tools for asserting influence.⁵

Economic ties grew but remained fragile. Latvia interpreted regional cooperation as a mechanism for ensuring stability and prosperity, while Russia sought to leverage energy exports as geopolitical tools, fostering division within the EU. Russian foreign policy towards Latvia lacked coherence, moving back and forth between cooperation and policies that reflected suspicion, nationalism, and a refusal to confront Soviet-era legacies, such as denying the 1940 occupation.

In 2007, Latvia ratified a long-delayed border treaty with Russia.² The treaty’s ratification finally closed a decades-long chapter of legal ambiguity but did little to fundamentally change the tone of bilateral relations, which remained as “negative stability”.

Despite deep-seated tensions, there were modest diplomatic overtures. In 2010, Latvian President Valdis Zatlers visited Moscow, signaling an interest in constructive engagement. The Latvian and Russian prime ministers met in 2013 at the Baltic Sea Forum, showing an ongoing economic dialogue.

Estonia’s relationship with Russia was relatively quiet until the Bronze Soldier crisis of 2007.⁶ In April of that year, the Estonian government relocated a Soviet-era World War 2 monument from central Tallinn to a military cemetery, sparking violent protests by Russian-speaking residents and fierce condemnation from Moscow. Following the monument’s relocation, Estonia was hit with an unprecedented wave of coordinated cyberattacks targeting banks, ministries, and media outlets. These attacks, which are attributed to Russian actors, though not officially claimed, marked a new era in asymmetric state aggression. Estonia responded to this by internationalizing the issue through appeals to NATO and the EU, and by establishing the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence in Tallinn in 2009, positioning Estonia as a leader in cybersecurity.⁶

The 2007 Bronze Soldier crisis marked not only a cultural flashpoint but also the advent of cyber warfare as a strategic tool. Russia’s large-scale military exercises, such as Zapad 2009 and Zapad 2013, alarmed Baltic governments, who viewed them as rehearsals for invasion scenarios. These fears intensified after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, which became a watershed moment. All three Baltic states lobbied strongly for NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, leading to the deployment of multinational battlegroups to Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia in 2017.⁷

Meanwhile, Russia’s policy of protecting “compatriots abroad” stoked tensions in Latvia and Estonia, where large Russian-speaking minorities were subject to controversial language and citizenship policies. The Kremlin’s rhetoric of framing these minorities as victims of discrimination was mirrored in state-sponsored media campaigns, contributing to fears of hybrid warfare and internal destabilization. In response, Baltic states tightened media regulations and expelled individuals linked to Russian intelligence operations.

Lithuania was particularly vulnerable to Russian energy dominance, which Moscow had exploited throughout the 2000s. In response, Lithuania built the KlaipėdaLNG terminal, which opened in 2014, to reduce reliance on Russian natural gas and energy. Lithuania also pushed for EU-wide energy solidarity, supporting the idea of an “energy NATO” to counteract Russia’s divide-and-conquer strategy within the EU.⁴

The Kaliningrad exclave, bordering Lithuania and Poland, remained a constant source of friction. Russian officials periodically escalated tensions by threatening to deploy Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad in retaliation for NATO’s missile defense installations in Europe. The region became a highlight in the broader East-West military standoff.⁷

2016-present

Latvia’s relations with Russia have undergone a sharp transformation since 2016, shaped by regional tensions, the invasion of Ukraine, and a push for energy and political independence. In 2018, the Latvian parliament condemned Russia’s actions during the Kerch Strait incident, which signaled early alignment with broader European criticism of Russian aggression. This foreshadowed a deeper rupture that would follow in 2022.

After Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Latvia swiftly condemned the aggression, supported Ukraine with humanitarian and military aid, and imposed sweeping sanctions.³ Latvian authorities banned Russian state media broadcasts, declared Russia a state sponsor of terrorism, and restricted entry for Russian citizens holding Schengen visas. In January, 2023, Latvia formally downgraded diplomatic relations by expelling the Russian ambassador and recalling its own envoy from Moscow. Russia responded in kind.⁸

Energy independence also became a central focus. In February 2025, the Baltic states disconnected from the Russian electricity grid and fully integrated with the European power network, which was a decisive move in decoupling from Russian influence.⁹ Throughout this period, Latvia has steadily deepened integration with Western institutions like NATO and the European Union. While Russian authorities have never disclosed the full extent of support provided to organizations and individuals in Latvia, fragmentary information occasionally appeared in Russian-language local press, hinting at covert influence efforts.

In Lithuania, the invasion of Ukraine triggered a similar response. The government condemned the war, declared a national emergency, and requested NATO consultations under Article 4. Following revelations of Russian war crimes in Bucha, Lithuania expelled the Russian ambassador and closed the Russian consulate in Klaipėda. In retaliation, Russia withdrew its consent for Lithuania’s consulate in Saint Petersburg.

Lithuania’s Seimas declared Russia a terrorist state in May 2022, also identifying its actions in Ukraine as genocide. That June, Lithuania announced restrictions on the transit of sanctioned Russian goods to Kaliningrad via its territory, prompting diplomatic backlash.⁸ In September, it joined Latvia, Estonia, and Poland in banning most Russian citizens with Schengen visas from entry.

In the following year, Lithuanian authorities took further internal security measures, identifying hundreds of Russian and Belarusian residents as national security threats and revoking their residence permits.⁹ In October 2024, Lithuania formally denounced bilateral treaties with Russia and Belarus, including those related to taxation and legal cooperation. The energy shift in early 2025 marked the culmination of years of strategic divergence.

Estonia also intensified its defensive posture. After the 2014 abduction of Estonian officer Eston Kohver by Russian agents, construction of a high-security border fence began with significant segments being completed by 2023.⁵ Estonia reacted strongly to the 2022 invasion by expelling Russian diplomats, banning state-controlled media, and designating Russia a terrorist state.

Diplomatic relations deteriorated further in early 2023 when Estonia expelled 21 Russian diplomats and technical staff.⁵ Russia retaliated by expelling Estonia’s ambassador, effectively downgrading relations. In February 2024, tensions escalated further when Russia placed Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas on a wanted list over the dismantling of Soviet monuments. The culmination of years of distancing came in February 2025 when Estonia joined the other Baltic states in disconnecting from the Russian grid and joining the EU electricity system.⁹

Conclusion

Over thirty years since reclaiming their independence, the Baltic states have moved from reluctant coexistence with Russia to firm estrangement. What began as a fraught post-Soviet transition defined by troop withdrawals and disputes over citizenship has evolved into a relationship shaped by sharp geopolitical confrontation, particularly after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Despite the pressures of geography and history, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have charted a consistent course toward Euro-Atlantic integration, democratic consolidation, and strategic autonomy.These developments culminated in their recent energy decoupling from Russia. In doing so, the Baltic states have not only reasserted their sovereignty but have emerged as some of the most vocal and resolute critics of Russian aggression in Europe, underscoring their transformation from Soviet republics to frontline defenders of Western values.

Footnotes:

1. Dmitri Trenin, Russian-Baltic Relations: A Decade after Separation, www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/01_brs_04_rbr.pdf.

2. Nils Muižnieks (Ed.), The Geopolitics of History in Latvian-Russian Relations, 2011, www.lu.lv/fileadmin/user_upload/lu_portal/eng/news/The_Geopolitics_of_History_in_Latvian-Russian_Relations.pdf.

3. Toomas Hendrik Ilves, “Estonia: The Shadow of Moscow,” Politique internationale 116 (2007): 265–280.

4. Dovile Jakniunaite, “A Small State in the Asymmetrical Bilateral Relations: Lithuania in Lithuanian-Russian Relations since 2004,” Baltic Journal of Political Science 4.1 (2015): 70–93.

5. Richard Milne and Ben Hall, “The Baltic Balancing Act over the Threat from Russia,” Financial Times, 18 Apr. 2024, www.ft.com/content/2047a8d3-3b6b-485a-bcfa-f42ae8e352ee.

6. Vladimir Sazonov, Illimar Ploom, and Viljar Veebel, “The Kremlin’s Information Influence Campaigns in Estonia and Estonian Response,” TalTech Journal of European Studies 12.1 (2022): 27–59.

7. Vilius Ivanauskas et al., “Kaliningrad Factor in Lithuanian - Russian Relations,” Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 15.1 (2017): 119–149.

8. “Latvia Lowers the Level of Diplomatic Relations with the Russian Federation,” Ārlietu Ministrija, www.mfa.gov.lv/en/article/latvia-lowers-level-diplomatic-relations-russian-federation.

9. Liudas Dapkus, “Baltic Nations Count Final Hours to Ending Electricity Ties to Russia,” AP News, 6 Feb. 2025, apnews.com/article/lithuania-baltics-russia-estonia-latvia-electricity-8a4da3b60cccf0c2fe7746496e941a71.

Cover photo: O.Nikers

by [Lillian Mullins]

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