Introduction

Since 1945, the topic of nuclear armaments has been on every country’s radar, shaping global geopolitics, defense strategies, and nuclear deterrence. In 2025, post-Soviet countries in Eastern Europe and the Baltics, still face tension with Russia’s imperialism, making the role of nuclear deterrence critical for European regional security and international security. In this context, I, as an American International Affairs student studying security policy, can offer a unique perspective into this critical topic. By exploring the current and past historical, geopolitical, and strategic dimensions of nuclear deterrence in the region, this piece will highlight Poland and the Baltics’ delicate position and the critical role they play within NATO’s defense framework. It will also shed some light on possible non-nuclear alternatives and NATO policy recommendations for a secure future for the region.

Historical Context

Throughout the Cold War, Eastern Europe played a central role in the political struggle between the NATO alliance and the Soviet Union. Poland, while not part of the Soviet Union, was a member of the Warsaw Pact, hosting significant Soviet military infrastructure, acting as a buffer zone for the Soviet Union. While most of the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal was within the Soviet Union itself, Poland’s military infrastructure was vital to the Soviet Union nuclear strategy. On the other hand, the Baltic states, which are Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, were completely engulfed by the Soviet Union, contributing to the Soviet Union’s Iron Curtain.

The nuclear deterrence strategy of NATO during the Cold War was based around the principle of collective defense, outlined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The NATO alliance maintained a strict nuclear stance to deter Soviet and Warsaw Pact aggression, placing U.S. nuclear weapons all across Western Europe to counter the Warsaw Pact’s nuclear and conventional capabilities. This strategy was built around the idea of maintaining the balance of power and preventing a Soviet advantage. (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2020)

The end of the Cold War, in 1991, completely changed geopolitics in Europe and the post-Soviet region. The dissolution of the Soviet Union led to the independence and democratization of the Baltic states, who eventually joined NATO in 2004. Prior to 2004, in 1999, Poland became a member of NATO, a complete 180 in its security interests. These security developments extended NATO’s influence eastward, closer to Russia, which has come with benefits and drawbacks. Recent actions by Russia, threatened by NATO, include the deployment of nuclear-capable Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad region in 2018, and the deployment of additional nuclear-capable Iskander missiles in Minsk, Belarus, in 2023. (Reuters, 2018) These recent security developments have raised concerns for NATO, especially Poland and the Baltics, creating a whole new set of complexities that NATO must navigate. (Karach, 2024)

Current Geopolitical Landscape

In 2014, the annexation of Crimea by Russia marked a change in geopolitics, with an impact we still see today, leading to increased tensions with NATO reevaluating its defense strategies. In response to Russia’s imperialism of Crimea, NATO established the Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in 2016, deploying NATO forces to the Baltics and Poland. The purpose of this program was to deter Russia’s aggression through visible and persistent military presence. (Palavenis, 2024)

Recent evolutions in the security landscape was marked by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This conflict not only highlighted Moscow’s willingness to use full military force to achieve its geopolitical goals, but also involved overt and explicit threats of nuclear escalation, a threat that shakes the world. Russian officials, alongside Vladimir Putin, issued statements that the use of nuclear weapons are justified if certain “red lines” were crossed. Such “red lines” include the involvement of a nuclear-armed state, such as the United States and NATO, in backing a non-nuclear state engaging in conflicts near Russia’s borders. (Williams, Hartigan, MacKenzie, & Younis, 2024)

In response to these escalations, Poland and the Baltic states have escalated their integration within NATO’s defense framework. Poland has passionately advocated for increased NATO troop deployments and has expressed interest in hosting nuclear armaments under NATO’s nuclear-sharing agreements. The Baltic states have welcomed and advocated for NATO’s presence, viewing the security alliance essential to their national security and sovereignty. The “eFP” forces stationed in these countries serve as a reassurance and commitment to NATO’s oath to collective defense. (Kepe, 2024)

The United States has played a critical role in shaping the nuclear security framework of the region. The European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), launched in 2014 after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, significantly increased U.S. defense spending in Eastern Europe. The increases in U.S. defense spending have prioritized infrastructure upgrades of Poland’s air bases, allowing for rapid deployment of NATO forces, if a crisis ever occurs. The program has also allocated funding for prepositioned equipment, such as tanks and heavy artillery, enhancing NATO readiness. Additionally, joint exercises like Defender Europe have enhanced interoperability between NATO and non-NATO allies. (United States Government Accountability Office, 2023)

This era of escalation since 2014 has been marked by several critical escalations and countermeasures that have fundamentally altered the security landscape of Eastern Europe for decades to come. Russia’s imperial actions and reckless nuclear threats was followed by a robust posturing of NATO and its member states, emphasizing a renewed efforts on deterrence in the region. The American Perspective

For many decades now, the United States has viewed Poland and the Baltic states as pivotal allies to NATO’s eastern defense. This is evident through the U.S. military investments and strategic initiatives in recent years, intended to reinforce regional security. Over the past five years, the United States has provided more than $34 million in security assistance to Poland, investing in their military mobility and awareness of potential threats. (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 2025) In addition to that, in 2024, the U.S. approved $228 million in military assistance to the Baltic states, investing in their air defense, Baltic Sea maritime awareness, and enhancement of land forces. (Le Monde, 2024)

Although the United States hasn’t publicly confirmed nor supported plans to deploy nuclear weapons in Poland or the Baltic states, there has been persisting debates about enhancing NATO’s deterrence posture in Eastern Europe, especially after Russia’s belligerent and reckless threats of the use of nuclear weapons. The platform known as “War on the Rocks” goes into great detail about making nuclear-sharing more credible and the approaches to nuclear-sharing in Europe. A practical approach, if nuclear weapons were to be deployed to Poland and the Baltic states, would involve the B61-12 gravity bombs, which are already part of NATO’s nuclear-sharing framework, but most were removed by the U.S. following the end of the Cold War. These gravity bombs, designed for use by dual-capable aircraft such as the F-35A Lightning II, allows for a stern deterrent combined with U.S. air superiority. Poland has already acquired the F-35A, allowing it to be integrated with existing NATO nuclear-sharing operations. (Kuhn, 2023) However, expanding these nuclear-sharing agreements to Poland and the Baltic states would be highly controversial, likely escalating the already high tensions with Russia, and turning Poland and the Baltics into a high priority target for their imperialist neighbor. (Erästö, 2023)

Non-Nuclear Alternatives

To ensure stability in today’s complex environment, current United States’ policy emphasizes robust non-nuclear deterrence strategies, including the growing cybersecurity environment and collaboration. Understanding that modern threats are multilayered and are everywhere, the United States openly advocates for a multi-domain approach to these threats that integrates cyber defenses, conventional forces, and resistance to disinformation. This is a robust strategy to address the ever-changing environment of modern conflicts, without escalating to nuclear conflict. (Razukevicius, 2025) As of today, cybersecurity has become a highlight of deterrence, with the U.S. and NATO increasing their collaboration on cyber resilience, joint training, and intelligence sharing to counter Russia’s persisting cyber-attacks on Europe. In 2022, NATO had officially recognized that cyberspace is in the domain of their operations, expanding the concept of collective defense to that realm, creating measures to respond to large-scale cyber-attacks. (Center for Strategic and International Studies, n.d.)

International arms control agreements and diplomacy continue to remain at the center for preventing nuclear escalation and maintaining stability, in Europe and internationally. New START, an agreement to limit the number of deployed nuclear warheads between the United States and Russia, has only helped so much in preventing uncontrolled escalation. In 2023, Russia suspended its participation in the New START agreement, making diplomatic efforts more complicated and increasing the concerns about erosion of arms control frameworks. (Reuters, 2023) Despite the reckless move by Russia, the United States and NATO have continued to advocate for diplomatic communication first to calm tensions and escalation, which also enhances transparency between the U.S. and Russia. However, this doesn’t mean in the preventative measures NATO has been investing in either, which are equally as important.

Conclusion

The security landscape of Eastern Europe continues to remain as a focal point for NATO’s defense, with Poland and the Baltic states being key players in deterring Russia’s imperialist aggression. Prior to the inauguration of U.S. President Donald Trump, the U.S. has shown strength through reinforcing NATO, especially Poland and the Baltics, with heavily funded initiatives like the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) and NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP), in addition to the expansion of cybersecurity collaboration. While nuclear weapons will continue to be at the forefront of nuclear deterrence, non-nuclear alternatives such as cyber resilience, arms control diplomacy, and conventional military deterrence are equally essential to maintain stability without unnecessary escalation. But keep in mind, Russia continues to challenge the international order and regional security. Putin, with unsettling ease, continues to be open to the idea of nuclear escalation, making the Baltics and Poland at the forefront of NATO’s security framework. With these ongoing threats, the U.S. and NATO are now more than ever, committed to the promise of collective defense. It’s been interesting, and worrisome, to watch this security dilemma unfold and evolve. My perspective and opinion, like the security environment, continues to evolve and change with new information appearing every day. It is young leaders, like me, that are the ones to inherit the world’s conflicts, and it is more important now, than ever, to continue to talk about this and continue research to solve these complex hostilities. 

References

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Center for Strategic and International Studies. (n.d.). Significant Cyber Incidents. Retrieved from Center for Strategic and International Studies: https://www.csis.org/programs/strategic-technologies-program/significant-cyber-incidents

Erästö, T. (2023, December 5). More investment in nuclear deterrence will not make Europe safer. Retrieved from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: https://www.sipri.org/commentary/essay/2023/more-investment-nuclear-deterrence-will-not-make-europe-safer

Karach, O. (2024, November 22). Nuclear weapons in Belarus: What we Know. Retrieved from The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons: https://www.icanw.org/nuclear_weapons_in_belarus_what_we_know

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Le Monde. (2024, March 23). US approves $228 million in military aid to the three Baltic states. Retrieved from Le Monde: https://www.lemonde.fr/en/united-states/article/2024/03/23/us-approves-228-million-in-military-aid-to-the-three-baltic-states_6647932_133.html

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Reuters. (2018, February 5). Russia deploys Iskander nuclear-capable missles to Kaliningrad. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/world/russia-deploys-iskander-nuclear-capable-missiles-to-kaliningrad-ria-idUSKBN1FP22B/

Reuters. (2023, February 21). Putin: Russia suspends participation in last remaining nuclear treaty with U.S. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-russia-suspends-participation-last-remaining-nuclear-treaty-with-us-2023-02-21/

United States Government Accountability Office. (2023, July). EUROPEAN DETERRENCE INITIATIVE: DOD Should Establish Performance Goals and Measures to Improve Oversight. Retrieved from United States Government Accountability Office: https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-105619.pdf

Williams, H., Hartigan, K., MacKenzie, L., & Younis, R. (2024, February 23). Russian Nuclear Calibration in the War in Ukraine. Retrieved from Center for Strategic and International Studies: https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-nuclear-calibration-war-ukraine

Cover photo: Olevs Nikers

by [Todd Meltzer]