Introduction

Latvia is a country just short of two million people located in between the two other Baltic states, Estonia and Lithuania. It is a relatively small country with a geographical size of 64,594 square kilometers. From the outside looking in, Latvia may appear as a small, peripheral state on Europe’s northeastern edge; yet beneath its modest size lies a nation shaped by profound historical trauma, cultural resilience, and a deeply layered political identity. With a recent history of occupation from both the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, Latvia continues to integrate perspectives of historical events into contemporary policy. Memory politics, in particular, serve as a cornerstone of Latvia’s defense posture, reinforcing efforts to preserve national identity and sovereignty. As a nation defined by successive occupations in the 20th century, Latvia approaches foreign policy through a lens of historical survival, a posture made ever more critical due to Russia’s renewed imperial ambitions in Ukraine and the region as a whole. This article explores how memory functions as both a political compass and a societal safeguard in Latvia, influencing its responses to present-day threats while preserving the legacy of its past.

Historical Context

Understanding the role of memory politics in Latvia comes first with understanding the context to which the memory manifests itself from. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia provides a brief analysis of Latvia’s history since it declared its first independence on November 18, 1918 officially from the Russian Empire, as well as German military formations. Sovereignty was recognized by both foreign entities in 1920 following a series of battles throughout Latvia, and the country was able to develop autonomously through parliamentary democratic rule for about 14 years.1 Though those 14 years served as an important stepping stone for implementing democratic practices into everyday Latvian life, there were evident moments of political instability that caused Latvian Prime Minister Karlis Ulmanis to shift towards authoritarian control in 1934 through the simultaneous dissolution of the parliament.1 Shortly after, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed in 1939 by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, secretly placing all three Baltic states under Soviet control with no legal backing or collective consent. The pact was intended to act as a non-aggression agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union amidst the start of World War II. Ultimately, it forced Latvia to agree to allowing Soviet military bases within its territory in 1939, further annexing the country into the Soviet Union in 1940.1 The pact proved to be detrimental in all aspects, as Nazi Germany would take control of Latvia in 1941. Soviet occupation in Latvia from 1940-1941 was characterized by harsh oppression and terror. The Cheka, or Soviet secret police NKVD (later KGB) in Latvia, ensured that Latvians remained loyal to Soviet ideologies through the message that anyone could become a political prisoner.2 The NKVD instigated looming threats of arrest and deportation for any real or perceived acts of conspiracy against the Soviet Union, and thousands of Latvians were arrested and even executed. The NKVD was evidently an instrument of terror to stimulate fear throughout Latvian society, as the repercussions for resisting Soviet integration were severe. Not only were Latvian citizens facing the erasure of their culture and lifestyle through routine purges carried out by the NKVD, people were also being ripped away from their homes as well. On June 14, 1941, thousands Latvians were forcibly deported to labor camps in Siberia through an act of political terror, in which families were separated and Latvians were forced to carry out strenuous labor in various gulags.3 Overall, the first Soviet occupation of Latvia was a solemn time of brutal political terror that aimed to suppress Latvian society and identity.

German control over Latvia stimulated an array of sentiments. Initially, many Latvians welcomed the idea of Nazi German occupation of Latvia in 1941, as it was assumed to be a form of liberation against Soviet control. However, Germany began carrying out its own acts of terror that greatly impacted Latvian society. One of the most notable aspects of Nazi occupation in Latvia was the execution of 90% of the Jewish community in Latvia.4 The Holocaust in Latvia was a devastating genocide that deeply impacts Latvian society to this day. Additionally, Nazi Germany forced Latvians to join the Waffen-SS Latvian Legion, essentially mobilizing Latvian citizens against Soviet troops that also contained Latvian citizens.5 About 115,000 Latvians were forced, against international law, to join the Latvian Legion, and many of them became prisoners of war in the Soviet Union after Germany’s defeat.5 Not only were Latvians exploited by Nazi Germany for mandatory military conscription, but many were never able to access social welfare programs or live standard lives following the end of World War II and the second Soviet occupation of Latvia. Nazi Germany’s control of Latvia only lasted until 1944, but it was a grave time of mass executions, ethnic belittlement, and citizen exploitation.

The Soviet Union regained control of Latvia in 1944 and executed the second, even larger wave of deportations in 1949. Any effort to promote Latvian statehood was diminished by the Soviet Union, and the next 47 years would be a time of stark russification and sovietization. Latvians were expected to adhere to Russian cultural practices, most notably by the full integration of Russian language into Latvian society, and Russian became the established official language of the country.6 Public institutions were expected to conduct business in Russian language, and Latvian language was effectively extinguished from everyday life.5 Additionally, the Soviet Union encouraged immigration of ethnic Russians into Latvia, in which Russians heavily impacted the ethnic makeup and cultural integrity of the country. These Russians were not expected to learn Latvian language or integrate into Latvian society, as the society was evidently tailored towards Russian ideologies. The dismantlement of a Latvian national identity was intentional and strategic, as the essence of the Soviet Union relied on a collective Soviet identity. Noncompliance to embracing such identity was challenged by arrest or deportation.6 Russification in Latvia meant that by 1989, ethnic Latvians only made up about 52% of the population, manifesting a period where Latvians were the minority ethnic group in certain areas of the country, including Riga.6 This was incredibly belittling and dehumanizing for Latvians, as both official state autonomy and cultural autonomy had been stripped away. Decades of suppression effectively allowed Latvia and the Baltic region as a whole to understand the necessity of fighting for individual statehood, and the Baltics began advocating for official independence in 1989.6 Though many acts of advocating for autonomy were faced with violence and condemnation from the Soviet Union, Latvia and the Baltic region were officially recognized as independent in September of 1991, finalized by the fall of the Soviet Union in December. It was a monumental achievement for Latvians who had faced oppression and political terror for decades, but the ethnic and political tensions caused by the memory of forced integration of Latvians into Russian culture would remain at the forefront of contemporary societal images. The events that occurred in Latvia during the 20th century were defined by successive occupations by the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, with both entities bringing mass human suffering and repression. Under prolonged Soviet control, these hardships were intertwined with systematic efforts to dissolve Latvian identity through russification, laying a foundation for the ongoing struggles surrounding historical sentiments and differing narratives of victimhood that are entirely prominent in Latvian politics today.

Memory Politics in Latvia

Latvia’s recent history of occupation and oppression is still fresh in living memory of Latvian citizens, with many people carrying the impacts of such events into contemporary social, cultural, and political situations. The blending of memory into institutional practices is called “memory politics”, where past sentiments are instrumentalized in an effort to shape future events. Memory politics usually involve differing perspectives throughout a collective society, in which historical events can be interpreted various ways with various emotional reactions.7 But because society dedicates substantial effort to recall monumental events of the past, memories can be mobilized in political institutions to ensure that policy can both encourage a collective perspective or ensure that past traumas are not repeated. In the case of Latvia, memory politics have become integrated within political institutions and social movements alike. The Latvian state plays an active role in shaping historical memory, most predominantly through commemoration days, legislation, and state-funded institutions that focus on preserving and highlighting Latvian hardship. The Latvian Saima, or parliament, has created three declarations that define Latvia’s contemporary political focus: “On the occupation of Latvia”, “On the Latvian legionnaires of WWII”, and “On the condemnation of the totalitarian Communist occupation regime implemented in Latvia by the USSR”.8 All three declarations emphasize a pivotal moment in Latvian history that encourage a sense of collective identity against traumatic or oppressive events. The first declaration especially embodies a deep condemnation towards the erasure of Latvia’s sovereignty, in which it officially determined that Latvia’s integration into the Soviet Union was illegal and against international law. The state also plays a part in facilitating national commemoration days to honor those who were affected by impactful events, such as the June 14th commemoration day for the 15,000 deportees in 1941, as well as a remembrance day on March 25 for the victims of the second mass deportations by the Soviet Union in 1949. State-led commemorations are held to not only annually remind individuals of the past traumatic events that shape Latvian society, but also to serve as a stepping stone for justifying legislation and policy that ensure that such events do not happen again.8 To further emphasize the state’s role within effectively institutionalizing memory in politics, former President Guntis Ulmanis created the Commission of Historians of Latvia in 1998, with its central priority being to investigate the crimes and consequences of Soviet and Nazi occupation on Latvia.8 The commission conducts research to provide to schools and government institutions in order to inform Latvian society on the atrocities that occurred during the 20th century, successfully ensuring that memory and history remain prevalent in contemporary policy. It is evident that Latvia has dedicated substantial effort towards mechanizing memory, highlighting the role that the Latvian state plays in deliberately embedding historical narratives into its political structure.

The government is not the only entity actively utilizing memory as a conduit for political motives. Latvian civil society has continuously engaged in social movements and political mobilizations to maintain a strong stance on history to inform societal change. One of the most iconic social movements in Latvia was in the 1989 Baltic Way movement where individuals throughout all three Baltic states joined hands in opposition towards Soviet occupation. The Baltic Way was a commemoration towards the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact that illegally established Latvia as a Soviet republic in 1939, and the collective Baltic opposition towards Soviet control and past trauma allowed for vast mobilization against the Soviet Union. Though the Baltic Way was a social movement at the time that exemplified stark consideration for memory as a mechanism, it itself has become a powerful message spread within current or recent memory based political movements. All three Baltic states celebrate the anniversary of the Baltic Way every year, recognizing it as a pivotal event that helped manifest independence through the collective effort of individuals within all three Baltic states. Additionally, Latvian political figures regularly reference the Baltic Way as a necessary movement both during its time and for contemporary societal outlooks.

‘Today the Baltic Way is no more the call for freedom and the demonstration of physical unity. Today the Baltic Way is the road of dynamic advancement, development and the road of cooperation for Europe’s common future" (Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs Indulis Berzins, 1999).

Despite a necessary aspect of collective identity that allows memory politics to thrive in a society, civilian and political movements highlight a very important aspect of memory-based politics that is necessary for understanding the challenges of collective identities: different people may perceive a specific event in different ways. This is incredibly evident within memory politics in Latvia, as it is a multi-ethnic, multicultural, and multi-linguistic state with an ethnic Russian population of 22%. The presence of two ethnic groups means that memory conflict is often prevalent due to two different collective memories of the same situations, one for Russians and one for Latvians.9 Both ethnic groups carry their own memories and respective “truths” about the events that occured in the country in the 20th century, in which it is widely agreed that Latvians hold a collective memory based on oppression and fear, while Russians generally hold a collective memory that is based on pride for a Soviet Union that beat fascism and encouraged russification. The presence of a dual collective memory in Latvia creates political and cultural fault lines, particularly around WWII anniversaries, commemoration days, and debates about language and citizenship laws. Though events like the Baltic Way highlight the power that memory can play in encouraging vast collective action, the thousands of hands connected across the Baltics should not discount the reality that a universal outlook on Soviet occupation did not, and does not exist.9 True collective memory is nearly impossible to forge when historical experiences diverge so significantly and when past political structures have treated these groups with unequal levels of representation. Social and political movements in Latvia during the 1990s created a distinct, and still present, line between those who aimed to see total Latvian sovereignty and cultural autonomy, and those who wanted to hold on to Soviet ideologies. The utilization of memory within politics can successfully encourage the remembrance of historical challenges that deeply impacted Latvian society, but to fully understand the scope of memory politics comes with recognizing that not every group within society was impacted the same way. Consequently, memory-based events or actions that aim to cast light on past hardships through collective unity highlight divisions within society, as not all ethnic communities and individuals can feel equally represented in a movement where an entity as ambiguous as memory is mobilized.

Memory-based politics emphasize one other crucial characterization of contemporary Latvian society that is prevalent in other post-occupation states as well: past narratives influence preparation for existential threats of the future.9 Soviet occupation in Latvia undoubtedly acts as a historical truth, but it has managed to become a framework for contemporary vigilance over emerging threats. This implies that memory politics in Latvia is not just about preserving traumatic memories, but weaponizing memories as a tool for defense and resilience. The institutionalization of memory would most likely lose necessity if a perceived existential threat did not exist, but in the case of Latvia, memory has merged with foreign policy especially regarding relations with neighboring Russia.8 There is an evident and deeply rooted sense of victimhood in Latvian national identity that is a result of years of illegal occupation and oppression, manifesting a widely held belief of “if it happened before, it can happen again”. However, Latvian victimhood is a defining factor within efforts of survival and legitimacy, mobilizing society around a common theme of identity preservation that directly merges into foreign policy. In the case of Latvia, victimhood should not be perceived as a form of weakness, rather a necessary lens through which potential threats can be combated and national identity can be maintained. The fear of renewed occupation, particularly rising from the aggressive patterns of Russia, allow memory-backed narratives to remain central in Latvian social and political spheres. The preservation of historical events is a strategic instrumentalization of memory in order to encourage efforts of Latvian statehood while solidifying policies of deterrence and geopolitical alignment amidst growing tension in the Eastern European neighborhood.8

Memory for Defense Policy

The weaponization of memory, specifically sentiments over past occupations and oppressive Soviet framework, has defined Latvia’s current defense and foreign policy. One of the most perceived threats to Latvia is Russia in regards to physical and ideological autonomy.8 Russia’s looming threat on Latvia’s national security became even clearer after the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, as well as the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Latvia understands that Russia can accurately be characterized as an aggressor state, with urgency to ensure Latvian national statehood exacerbated by both the geographical position of Russia and the memory of past Soviet occupation over Latvian territory. Therefore, the narrative of memory politics is used to justify the need for intense investment in national defense mechanisms, as seen in many defense initiatives ranging from government spending to NATO-aligned military exercises.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Membership

Latvia began its path towards international strategic partnerships very soon after gaining independence in 1991. Before full integration into NATO, Latvia first joined a NATO program called “Partnership for Peace” in 1994, in which Latvia could work with NATO individually to prioritize defense capabilities and ensure stability at both domestic and foreign levels.10 This early step towards NATO alignment was essential for Latvia in regards to developing a defense strategy, and it emphasized the overall necessity of external partnerships for maintaining total sovereignty. Naturally, Latvia gained full NATO membership in 2004, signaling the start of NATO military presence in Latvia.10 For the next 20 years, NATO-backed military exercises and developments in Latvia would be at a steady increase, with the country proving undoubtedly reliant on Western alignment and foreign partnerships for national defense. In 2017, the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) group led by Canada was established in Latvia, in which NATO’s eastern flank saw stark increases in defense and deterrence capabilities due to the presence of an enhanced battlegroup backed by over ten NATO member states.11 Through the eFP, Latvia has received military troops from various different countries, including around 2,000 constantly rotated military personnel from Canada, as well as military equipment such as tanks and fighter jets.11 In 2018, NATO began its development of the Multinational Division “North” (MND-N) which is currently headquartered at Camp Adazi in Latvia.10 “North” symbolizes yet another NATO initiative to secure Latvia and the Baltic region as a whole, ensuring that NATO maintains combat readiness on its Eastern flank through the collective effort of various member states including Canada, Germany, Italy, and more.12 “North” officially reached maximum combat readiness in 2023, meaning that the division is fully prepared to deploy, operate, and fight under NATO command in any operational environment.10 Additionally, Latvia created the NATO Multinational Brigade in 2024, becoming the first country to increase its NATO forward presence.13

Latvia’s integration into NATO and its active participation in military exercises reflect a clear and deliberate geopolitical orientation towards international partnerships and Western alignment. Latvian leaders, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs Baiba Braže, explicitly frame NATO as critical for countering overt and hybrid outside aggression especially in regards to neighboring Russia, rooted in historical sentiments towards occupation and oppression. Since gaining NATO membership in 2004, Latvia has institutionalized its alliance through substantial efforts to maintain and increase NATO presence in the region, as seen through the enhanced Forward Presence and other exercises such as BALTOPs and the Baltic Sentry program. These essential steps embed collective memory into Latvia’s defense culture, transforming NATO from simply a military alliance into a vessel of resilience and vigilance. Though NATO requires member states to maintain at least 2% of GDP towards defense budgets, Latvia has consistently maintained a defense GDP above this threshold and predicts that its 2025 defense budget could amount to 3.65% of GDP towards military capabilities and enhanced infrastructure.15 The sheer amount of state funding dedicated towards defense represents Latvia’s dedication towards not only maintaining strong, reliable relations with NATO, but also dedication towards ensuring a sovereign and secure Latvian state. Each increase in defense spending is memory translated into deterrence and defense.

“ I think all countries are subject to Russian sub-conventional attacks already now. That means cyber, that means sabotage, that means killings of certain people… So we have to be very sure that we know that we have that intelligence cooperation between military and civilian intelligence, and that we have that situational awareness about what Russia is doing in all respects, not only militarily - meaning where it’s moving it’s troops, how it’s attacking Ukraine, what is Ukraine doing, where is Russia’s vulnerabilities - but also about internal security. We have to be very, very sure what is happening. And that’s what we all are doing within the alliance (Lativan Minister of Foreign Affairs Baiba Braže, 2025). 14

Latvia’s National Defense Strategy

Latvia’s goals for its national defense initiative emphasize a memory-informed posture towards handling potential threats and security concerns, particularly as it pertains to Russia. In 2023, Latvia released a blueprint for defense strategies and military goals, The State Defense Concept 2023-2027. The concept is mandated by Article 29 of Latvia’s National Security Law, and is revised or updated every Saima term. The current concept outlines many key focuses that range from threat assessments to foreign partnership strategies, but one of the most notable components is its direct reference to Russian security concerns. The concept lays out explicit threats posed by Russia, as well as potential offensive scenarios that Russia could conduct that underline Latvia’s concern over real or perceived Russian aggression. Per the concept, Latvia understands that contemporary Russia exhibits past Soviet characteristics in the sense that it aims to increase its sphere of influence throughout Eastern Europe, fueled by desires to recreate a Soviet-like atmosphere where Russia can dominate a physically and ideologically.16 The concept notes that Russia’s goal for increased regional influence is exacerbated by the overlook of international established laws and norms, reliance on nuclear warfare as a fear tactic, and the transition away from democratic practices into a totalitarian regime complete with propaganda and harsh control over media sources.16 After establishing that Russia is indeed a threat to Latvian national security and should be perceived as an aggressive state with oppressive motives, the concept lays out potential scenarios where Russia could directly breach Latvian defensive strategies. This could be in the form of hybrid threats through the damage of critical infrastructure or cyberattacks, or a on-the-ground military attack through the mass mobilization of infantry troops to seize territory.16

“The threat to Latvia’s security could arise from a sudden military attack by Russia to seize a certain territory that may be followed by threats to use nuclear weapons, aiming to deter involvement of NATO reinforcements” (The State Defense Concept 2023-2027).

Despite substantial dialogue dedicated towards emphasizing the threat and sheer consequences of Russia and its expansionist goals, the concept lays out a solid doctrine for Latvia’s defense capabilities in opposition to its neighbor. Latvia envisions a defense strategy that is entirely focused on defending territory and human lives, in which the democratic framework of Latvia can be protected only if its physical boundaries are securely maintained.16 Latvian statehood will be preserved through alliances and international partnerships, collective action amongst government institutions and civil society, and deep investment in defense spending and military infrastructure.16 To emphasize how Latvian sovereignty is dependent on collective action, the concept notes that a wide array of institutions and entities, including NGOs, local and national governments, private companies, and civil society, must be readily prepared to overcome security threats on account of Latvia’s survivability.16 The concept and Latvia’s national security goals as a whole are made all the more vital amidst Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, in which it was established to the world that Russia will not hesitate to take aggressive routes for its own national interest. Latvia’s defense concept is explicit: Russia is the main threat to national security, and Russia’s capability of a sudden and overwhelming military incursion is undeniable. Latvia’s focus on Russian aggression embeds historical memory of Soviet occupation into its logic and reasoning for a national defense strategy so reliant on defending its statehood against Russian influence, and the war occuring in Ukraine is perceived as a continuation and direct warning of destabilizing behavior that threatens the security of Latvia.

Civic Identity and Civil-Military Cooperation

Though defense is often centralized in spheres of military and government institutions, Latvia has proven that national security can be encouraged through cultural programming and civil-military initiatives. Latvian education systems encourage courses over history and contemporary efforts on defense strategies in an effort to expand civic understanding of foreign policy and geopolitical tensions. The Ministry of Defense for Latvia notes that national security is a fundamental concept that Latvian citizens should be exposed to within education systems, hoping to implement a broadened awareness of national security into children that can translate into a desire to participate in such initiatives by higher education.17 The framework behind national defense lessons in education systems surrounds the idea that educators should encourage students to understand Latvian statehood at a cultural and political level, focusing deeply on heightened awareness over the country of Latvia itself in respect towards adversaries and potential threats.17 The Ministry of Defense has also prepared a simulation to be taught in schools in the event of a security breach, allowing children to develop the capacity to both understand and react to events of foreign aggression.17 These efforts within education systems create a framework of societal preparedness, allowing citizens to understand Latvian history and contemporary avenues towards national defense initiatives.

As the Latvian Ministry of Defense emphasizes a desire to educate citizens on ways to contribute to national security from young ages, civil-military partnerships highlight how this sentiment directly translates into real-world situations. Almost immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Latvia utilized its new-found independence to establish a volunteer national guard, the Zemessardze.18 The volunteer National Guard currently contains around 10,000 active volunteers that are selflessly working to enhance national security efforts through participation in this civil-military initiative.18 The main objective of the National Guard is to create a sphere where civilians can take part in protecting the sovereignty and national security of Latvia, emphasizing the necessity of collective civilian action to maintain internal and external stability in the country. Additionally, the Zemessardze participated in a military exercise in March of 2025 in collaboration with the Canadian Forces Command, the United States 5th Corps, NATO MND-North, and representatives from various German military brigades.19 The exercise, called NATRIX 2025, aimed to educate Latvian National Guard troops on civil threat assessments and how to relay information in a time of conflict.19 This exercise symbolizes how Latvia is able to utilize civil partnerships for a greater goal of national security initiatives. The Zemessardze also collaborated with local communities and education systems to solidify the relationship between historical awareness and the role of civil society in contemporary threat prevention mechanisms. National security curriculum in school systems, mixed with the collaboration between civilians and military mobilization, reflect a strategic sentiment that an informed and motivated public rooted in collective memory is a critical, but often overlooked, safeguard to Latvian statehood.

The key to characterizing defense policy in contemporary Latvia is understanding that defense is not strictly motivated through military terms alone. From NATO membership in 2004 to its comprehensive defense strategy and civil engagement programs, Latvia has integrated memory politics into every layer of its defense architecture. The dedicated efforts that Latvia has taken to develop itself and its security framework reflect an idea larger than just government initiatives, in which these strategies symbolize a nation that remembers what it is like to lose sovereignty. In Latvia, memory is institutionalized, weaponized, and mobilized, especially when re-emerging tensions bring back feelings of uncertainty and existential threats. Latvia’s defense model is evidently framed around utilizing memory as a mechanism for survival.

The Future of Memory within Defense

It has been established that memory, though inherently based on events from the past, plays a huge role in shaping the dynamics of the future. This notion implies that as long as Latvia continues to develop and enhance its national defense posture, memory will always be an aspect of the process. Latvia has already released a wide array of statements for its goals and aspirations regarding defense and national security, and by underlining the future of Latvia’s defense strategy, it can be more easily understood how memories of historical events translate into the predictive and adaptive nature of national security. One of the most notable aspects of Latvia’s goals for national security is its desire to increase defense spending over the next couple of years. The Latvian Saima has already approved the defense budget for the current 2025 cycle, in which 3.5% of GDP, or 1,559,433,634 euros, will be allocated entirely towards defense.15 The breakup of defense spending ensures that 42% of the cost will go directly towards military developments, specifically the National Armed Forces (NAF).15 In conjunction with the steady increase of the defense budget for 2025, the Saima states that defense spending will reach around 1,655,000,000 euros by 2028.15 As for the 42% of the defense budget that will go to the NAF this current year, the Saima projects that 200.15 million euros will be allocated towards air defense capabilities, 139.61 million euros will go towards ammunition and other forms of equipment, and 111.44 million euros will be put towards infantry vehicles.15 The remainder of the budget will help fund autonomous weapon systems, mortars and long-range rockets, and radar systems for maritime activities.15 The link between rising defense budget and an existential Russian threat highlights a national security policy grounded in the connection between historical and contemporary geopolitical tensions.

In conjunction with the bold increase of the Latvian national defense budget, the State Defense Concept references various future goals regarding Latvia’s posture in the global community, maintaining a heavy focus on future relations with foreign partnerships. The concept states that it is critical for Latvia to continue to participate in joint military exercises and multilateral international missions in order to guarantee a future of continuous allyships and global security initiatives.16 Essentially, the future of Latvian relations with external alliances depends on the commitment towards interdependability at a global scale. The concept also states that the future of defense and a sovereign Latvian state depends on Latvia’s ability to defend Ukraine through military aid and political backing.16 Overall, defense policy in Latvia within the coming years is on the basis of promoting global partnerships and international geopolitical stability, and it is in the best interest of Latvia to continue allocating resources towards a solid and cooperative defense structure. As a common theme within memory-based politics and its translation into Latvian defense mechanisms, the past is not just a vessel for remembrance, rather a means of moving forward. Defense policy can instrumentalize memory as a strategic asset for combatting future threats, as seen in increased allocations in defense spending, deepened global partnerships, and the preservation of international order to promote collective security throughout the region.

Conclusion

This article intentionally began with examining the historical context in which memory-based politics are rooted from. By doing so, I hope to emphasize the notion that past events are not simply distant backdrops that are left in time, rather the catalyst from which memory politics and contemporary policy can emerge. The trauma in Latvian society from Soviet and Nazi occupations continue to impact ways of life and overall collective outlooks, not just in a sphere of remembrance, but as a critical foundation for influencing current national security initiatives. After discussing the historical events that drastically shape Latvian cultural and political identity, it was necessary to explain the concept of memory-based politics and what this looks like in regards to political and civil institutions. Memory politics in Latvia exist because the impacts of occupation and total loss of autonomy remain prominent in Latvian national consciousness, creating a collective imperative throughout various mediums to never repeat the past. This shared imperative is widely institutionalized through government-backed initiatives and policies, as well as throughout civilian movements and social practices. State institutions mobilize memory as a direct way to influence policy and formal doctrines, while civil society participates in events of preservation to personalize these narratives and mend them into everyday life. Though these forces ensure that memory can greatly influence Latvia’s political and social atmosphere, it is important to note that collective memory and movements cannot realistically exist with the presence of groups that do not share the same experiences and levels of trauma. In the case of Lativan occupation, the ethnic Russian population represents a group of individuals who may not feel the impacts of memory politics as strongly, nor do they feel the need to mobilize as greatly against the entities that caused so much trauma and oppression against the Latvian community. Nonetheless, memory plays a large role in informing national identity, encouraging civil engagement and collective movements, and influencing defense and security strategy through a number of ways.

While memory politics might be seen as a sensitive or even vulnerable reaction to past trauma, in Latvia it serves as a powerful foundation for robust defense mechanisms. Sentiments from the past encouraged the movement towards extremely valuable international partnerships, solidified by permanent military presence in the country by a number of foreign alliances. Memories of past occupations also heavily aid Latvia in remaining vigilant and open to the idea of future security concerns, arguably allowing the country to gain a strategic headstart in deterring and defending against existential threats like neighboring Russia. Rather than a perceived weakness from holding on to traumas from the past, memory and a conscious engagement with history fuels national defense initiatives, shapes public and political outlooks on geopolitics, and most importantly, ensures that sovereignty in Latvia is a priority in order to safeguard against the erasure of a national identity that Latvians cherish and take deep pride in.

Citations

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Cover photo: Olevs Nikers

by [Vienne Abrahamian]