Introduction

The 21st century has experienced a detrimental shift away from one of the most fundamental regulations of international stability since 1945: territorial borders should not be challenged with force or aggression. Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 defied international norms that aimed to set a precedent for national security and individual statehood. The subsequent invasions of Ukraine proved to the global community that Russia would go to extreme lengths to increase its sphere of influence over post-Soviet republics, causing widespread concern surrounding the idea that other countries could be next. In an effort to deter the possibility of a Russian land invasion, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania proposed the Baltic Defense Line, an initiative to enhance military fortifications along their Russian and Belarussian borders. Latvia’s Ministry of Defense has invested heavily to create secure and controlled border mechanisms that rely on heightened military infrastructure with hopes to prevent the aggressive movement of Russian influence into the country. Latvia’s fortification efforts and the wider enforcement of the Baltic Defense Line reflect a necessary shift towards NATO-aligned deterrence and increased territorial control, highlighting a current geopolitical stage that does not dismiss possibilities of invasion. This analysis aims to review government reports and academic articles that assess the necessity and effectiveness of the Baltic Defense Line as it pertains to ensuring a sovereign and secure Latvian state.
Background on Latvia’s National Defence Efforts.

The Baltic Defense Line and Latvia’s decision to enhance its border fortifications are aligned with a strategic foreign policy that prioritizes national security and careful deterrence of Russian aggression. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 stimulated vast concern amongst the Baltic states, in which there is common sentiment that the outcome of the war corresponds directly to the wellbeing of the Baltics. LSE IDEA, a foreign policy think tank in London, created a report analyzing Latvia’s initial response to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The report points out that many aspects of Latvia’s national defense has been enhanced, including rising numbers in Latvia’s volunteer army and National Guard, participation in NATO military exercises in Latvia with members like the United States Army Special Forces, and the overall increase of the defense budget with hopes to maintain above 3% of GDP in the coming years (LSE IDEA). The report claims that Latvia’s hastened military response to recent Russian aggression is informed by both memories of Soviet occupation and new threats of Russian expansionism (LSE IDEA). From a geographical standpoint, the threat imposed by Russia’s proximity to Latvia is undeniable. The report states that as of 2016, it would take around 36 to 60 hours for Russia to occupy Riga, though it is important to note that much has changed militarily on both sides within the last decade (LSE IDEA). Nonetheless, the report brings light towards the necessity of understanding that the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has caused heightened security concerns throughout the Baltics, and changes to national security measures on Latvia’s behalf are on account of challenging Russian aggression in the region. The report continues on to suggest that the Baltic states should collectively continue to identify areas where defence capabilities can be enhanced to further deter Russian influence into the area, focusing on a strong eastern border with permanent troops and military infrastructure (LSE IDEA). LSE IDEA’s comprehensive analysis over Russia’s threat on the Baltic states creates a solid foundation for understanding how Baltic national defense strategies currently center on countering the persistent threat posed by Russia, focusing on deepened collective integration of defense strategies.

Mirroring the collective understanding of Russia’s looming threat over Baltic security amidst its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Latvian government released its Annual Report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baiba Braže, reinforcing the necessity of strengthened national security efforts. The report emphasizes Latvia’s stark increase in its defense budget in 2024 that reached 3.3% of GDP, in which ample measures were taken to solidify regional defense capabilities to decrease the possibility of a Russian invasion of Latvia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Latvia). The reports security considerations are rooted in both supporting Ukraine and deterring Russian aggression into the region, in which it is reasonable to infer that Latvia’s national security is dependent on a secure and monitored eastern flank. Though the report does not directly reference the Baltic Defense Line, it is a meaningful assessment over the overall necessity of an enhanced Latvia national defense strategy.

The Baltic Defense Line

It is evident that Latvia and the Baltic states are placing substantial effort into combating the threat of neighboring Russia, and the Baltic Defense Line is extremely representative of this goal. The Ministry of Defense for the Republic of Latvia released a report outlining Latvia’s border fortification efforts that began in 2024. According to the report, the Baltic Defense Line is an initiative to enhance fortifications along the Baltic eastern border, focusing on military infrastructure to directly deter Russia from challenging the Baltic states and NATO (Ministry of Defense Republic of Latvia). Despite the initiative being a collective effort among Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, each state is responsible for individual funding and military developments along its border. The report claims that the Baltic Defense Line initiative contains the Eastern Border Fortification and Counter-mobility Plan, approved by the Cabinet of Ministers in 2024, meaning that the entirety of the Russian and Belarusian-Baltic border will be fortified (Ministry of Defense Republic of Latvia). For Latvia, border reconstruction entails the addition of anti-tank trenches, dragon teeth anti-tank obstacles, storage areas to contain critical defense utilities such as mines and explosives, and methods to quickly close roads and transport routes in the event of an invasion (Ministry of Defense Republic of Latvia). As of current, the Latvian National Armed Forces have begun construction of a physical boundary along the eastern border that is supported by the deployment of two new National Armed Forces units to the border, and 20 defense storage units have been instituted in Latgale (Ministry of Defense Republic of Latvia). The report also lays out the upcoming goals for Latvia’s Baltic Defense Line contribution, stating that the continuation of border enhancements will amount to around 303 million euros over the next five years (Ministry of Defense Republic of Latvia). The report provides a solid baseline for understanding Latvia’s role in defending the Baltic eastern flank, overall supporting the idea that Latvia aims to contribute to NATO’s collective defense strategy against impeding aggressor states such as Russia.

The Ministry of Defense for the Republic of Latvia provides an unambiguous perspective for Latvia’s role in the Baltic Defense Line, but it is critical to investigate the challenges and complexities of the initiative. The Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) maintains a practical approach towards analyzing the Baltic Defense Line, claiming that border fortification enhancements along the Baltic eastern flank will be an obstacle in itself. Specifically for Latvia, the FPRI states that Latvia’s extensive border with Russia and Belarus amounts to 133 miles and 107 miles, meaning that the sheer length and varied terrain along the border will potentially complicate construction, resource allocation, and overall monitoring of border developments (FRPI). As Latvia contains little natural boundaries on its eastern flank, in comparison to Estonia’s border that contains Lake Peipus, Lake Pihkva, and the Narva River, Latvia will need to construct more physical fortifications to make up for the lack of natural obstacles. According to the FRPI, this would amount to the necessity of 1,116 bunkers with a density of around five bunkers per linear mile (FRPI). Not only will it be challenging to finalize the construction of over a thousand stationary bunkers along the eastern border, but it will also be challenging to do so without Russia being able to identify the location of the bunkers, leading to reevaluation of its own offensive strategies (FRPI). Latvia must also dedicate valuable discussion over the transportation routes it shares with Russia and Belarus, as there is one railway, two major road crossings, and multiple small road crossings between Latvia and the two states that realistically prevent the construction of bunkers and military infrastructure (FRPI). The FRPI provides analysis over one other aspect of the Baltic Defense Line that potentially stimulates challenges to the overall Baltic national defense strategy, in that prioritizing a static defense posture over elasticity may prove disastrous in the event of an invasion. Setting up bunkers along the border, according to the FRPI, prevents opportunity for maneuver warfare that has historically been favored by NATO and Western defense strategies (FRPI). The Baltic Defense Line by nature implies that guarding terrain is at the forefront of the defense strategy, and military maneuverability is less likely to be accomplished by this method of defense. Nonetheless, the FRPI concludes that the Baltic Defense Line is a reasonable response on behalf of the Batlic states to the current geopolitical implications of neighboring Russia, and it is a solid strategy of potential deterrence towards Russian aggression. This analysis is a critical reminder of the challenges that arise during shifts in defense strategies, and it would be detrimental to dismiss such challenges when assessing the Baltic Defense Line.

In an effort to emphasize the level of contribution that the Baltic states must undergo to see a successful Baltic Defense Line, the United States Army War College provides yet another constructive approach towards the initiative. The USAWC compares the Baltic Defense Line to the 1989 Baltic Way movement, where citizens throughout the Baltics linked hands to create a 600km chain in response to Soviet occupation (USAWC). Though the Baltic Defense Line relies on military infrastructure rather than citizen mobilization, it signals the demand of sustained, tangible contributions from each state to achieve meaningful collective security. The USAWC makes the argument that Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have committed to providing 60 million euros annually to the initiative, which would amount to around 8% of the defense budget within Latvia and Estonia while only 2.8% for Lithuania (USAWC). When comparing Latvia’s 8% defense contribution to Lithuania’s 2.8% contribution, it raises concerns about unequal defense contributions that would imply asymmetrical responses in national defense strategies, going against a collective Baltic effort that is necessary to deter Russia. Additionally, the USAWC provides a fresh perspective about potential obstacles that arise when citizens may need to willingly give up portions of their land for the government initiative. Noting that the areas in Latvia that are close to major border crossing points, such as Ludza, Viļaka, and Daugavpils, contain a large population of ethnic Russians, it will prove undoubtedly difficult to convince such ethnic populations to allow construction of bunkers on their land, if need be (USAWC). By mentioning the potential challenges that could arise by concentrating the Baltic Defense Line in an area that contains a high amount of ethnic Russians, the USAWC hopes to emphasize that voluntary citizen mobilization that was necessary during the Baltic Way may not be reciprocated in contemporary events of a Russian invasion. However, the USAWC notes that the Baltic Defense Line is undeniably a symbol of Baltic collective effort to maintain statehood and a solid national defense strategy, though highly dependent on efforts of collective collaboration between both all the Baltic states and their respective citizen populations.

Conclusion

In our current geopolitical atmosphere where it is clear that Russia will go to extreme lengths to expand its sphere of influence, the Baltic states are forced to revise national defense strategies to ensure their statehood against neighboring Russia. The Baltic Defense Line, or the enhancement of fortifications and military infrastructure along the eastern flank, is representative of such sentiments. Latvia has taken vast measures to secure its border against Russia and Belarus through physical military developments on its eastern border, with plans to continue its fortification efforts to the utmost extent. There are currently multiple reports that assess the overall strength and challenges of the Baltic Defense Line, and it is realistic to claim that despite a common agreement that the initiative will face substantial challenges that range from infrastructural obstacles to inspiring collective effort throughout the Baltics, the Baltic Defense Line is critical to deter Russian aggression from entering the Baltic states. Latvia, a country with around 1.8 million residents, is entirely worth defending, and it is defense strategies such as the Baltic Defense Line that suggest that aggressor states such as Russia should be handled with proactive approaches to ensure security and statehood.

Work Cited

Foreign Policy Research Institute. Lukas Milevski. The Baltic Defense Line. Feb. 2, 2024. Eurasia Program. https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/02/the-baltic-defense-line/?utm_source=FPRI+E-Mails&utm_campaign=97aede9109-Email-Insights-2024-feb9&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_e8d0f13be2-97aede9109-179236088

Ministry of Defense Republic of Latvia. Border Fortification. 2024. https://www.mod.gov.lv/en/border-fortification

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Latvia. Annual Report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Jan. 10, 2025. https://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/article/baiba-braze-main-task-latvias-foreign-policy-and-will-be-strengthen-our-security-economic-development-and-prosperity?utm_source=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F

LSE Ideas. Leon Hartwell. Winter is Coming: The Baltics and the Russia- Ukraine War. December 2022. https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/reports/2022-12-05-BalticRussia-FINALweb.pdf

United States Army War College. Kevin Ryan. The New ‘Baltic Way’: Assessing the Baltic Defense Line Concept. https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/12/23/the_new_baltic_way_assessing_the_baltic_defensive_line_concept_1080347.html?mc_cid=68dce391a0&mc_eid=4a12fa02c2

Cover Photo: Olevs Nikers

by [Vienne Abrahamian]