Introduction

The Arctic is a region in the Northern Hemisphere surrounding the North Pole, containing eight Arctic States: Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Finland, Sweden, and the United States. Around a decade ago, ice caps and glaciers largely prevented exploration of Arctic territory; however, rising global temperatures that impact the Arctic around three times as much as the rest of the world has caused ice caps to melt, glaciers to dissipate, and permafrost to thaw, profoundly changing the physical landscape of the area while increasing maritime accessibility.1 Climate change in the Arctic raises concerns that go beyond the scope of global environmental stability: increased maritime accessibility in the Arctic has stimulated rising geopolitical concerns, specifically surrounding navigational rights and territorial claims. The widened economic and commercial opportunities that come from increased navigational capabilities are vast. Arctic nautical accessibility opens up the potential for more convenient shipping routes for Europe, Asia, and North America, as well as the opportunity for natural resource extraction. The economic imperatives for Arctic exploration are undeniable, and Russia has recently pursued an Arctic strategy heavily reliant on increased military activity, highlighting its aggressive approach to influence a region overwhelmingly inhabited by NATO-backed states. Russia’s militarization of the Arctic signals a stark shift in historical Arctic stability and regional cooperation. By adapting an aggressive approach to gain Arctic superiority, Russia not only poses an extreme threat to global security efforts, but it highlights an evident desire to undermine Western institutions through physical expansion and regional power projection.

Russia’s Interest in the Arctic

Russia’s historical interest in the Arctic dates back to the 15th century conquest of Siberia under Ivan the Terrible, a time of heightened interest in natural resources and the development of regional trading routes.2 Russia’s contemporary Arctic strategy remains reliant on economic imperatives, and its post-Soviet claims to Arctic territory have been bold and extensive. In 2001, Russia submitted a continental shelf claim essentially declaring around 1.2 million square kilometers of the Arctic to be Russian territory.3 This was met with extreme condemnation amongst Arctic states. Russia has continued its ambitious efforts to gain regional superiority over the Arctic despite its 2001 claim not being approved, especially when the Kremlin determined that gas and oil extraction would pave the way for energy superiority and “superpower” status within the global order.2 As of current, the Arctic Council reports that Russia holds around 24,150 kilometers of Arctic Coastline, which is 53% of the Arctic Coastline, ranging from the entirety of the Murmansk Region, northern parts of the Arkhangelsk Region, and multiple islands and archipelagos.4 Russia’s Arctic territories heavily influence its natural gas and oil industry, allowing it to remain as a large global producer of natural resources. Russia envisions its Arctic territory as a vast economic hub, and the commercial benefits generated by investing in innovation in the region is already evident. About 10% of Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) comes from its Arctic Zone, as well as 20% of its total exports.2 As of 2024, 83% of Russia’s natural gas was extracted from its Arctic territory, and the country has invested in three large-scale liquefied natural gas (LNG) plants since 2009: Sakhalin-2, Yamal-LNG, and Arctic LNG 2.5 Aside from its extraction industry, Russia also hopes to create a solidified Northern Sea Route that would essentially pave its northern coast into a maritime transit zone between Asia and Europe within the next decade.2 The NSR is only accessible during the summer months, but Russia hopes to invest more heavily in infrastructure to ensure a year-round operational period that could make it into a major global shipping route. Russia’s national economy is undeniably reliant on its Arctic Zone, enhancing Russia’s position in the global economy.

Russia’s Arctic Strategy: Militarization

Russia has begun to substantially invest in military infrastructure within its Arctic territories in an effort to support its navigational capabilities along the NSR. Rising global temperatures have created a new dynamic in the Arctic, one that is defined by increased naval accessibility that encourages maritime activity. Russia has turned towards a heightened military presence in an effort to deter foreign influence in its Arctic territory, signaling its desire to defend its interests in the region. Russia’s military strategy in the High North has taken many forms, notably beginning with the re-establishment of Soviet-era military bases and the development of new ones.6 Russia has around 14 airfields operational throughout its Arctic territory.6 A vast majority of these bases are focused on search and rescue (SAR) and resupply operations, but some of them provide defense capabilities. The Tiksi base, located in the Kola Peninsula, is an air defense and tactical aviation base equipped with Russian MiG-31’s and Su-25’s.6. The Severomorsk-1 and 3 base, located in the Murmansk Oblast, also contains tactical aviation, and the Vorkuta base in the Kimi Republic has Tu-22M3 supersonic strike bombers and an early-warning radar station.6 Russia has been consistently deploying troops to its Arctic Zone since 2013 as part of its Arctic Brigade, and troops are mostly tasked with monitoring activity along the NSR through surveillance and reconnaissance operations.6 Russia’s Arctic military strategy is also dependent on its Northern Fleet and Rosatom nuclear icebreaker fleet. The Northern Fleet is equipped with around 41 warships and 43 submarines, eight of the submarines being nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.7 In 2021, Russia officially proclaimed the Northern Fleet as its fifth military district, creating a centralized command force entirely focused on Arctic military operations.2 A military district in the Arctic is strategically important for the maneuverability of Russia’s military, allowing hubs of military infrastructure to quickly shift into a front in a wartime scenario. Additionally, Russia has gained superiority regarding its icebreaker fleet, currently equipped with 34 diesel-powered ships and seven nuclear-powered.8 Though icebreakers play a minimal role in military capability, they have allowed Russia to maintain a strong presence in the Arctic through increased maritime accessibility. Russia’s reliance on hard power in order to defend its regional interests emphasize a shifting level of tensions in the High North, as heightened military operations inherently pose a real or perceived threat to NATO-backed Arctic states.

Militarization as a form of Power Projecting

Russia’s increased efforts of militarizing its Arctic Zone can be viewed as a form of power projection, especially in a time of escalating expansionist ideologies exhibited by Russian President Vladmir Putin. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 successfully highlighted Russia’s goal of weakening international order that has historically been held together by Western norms. Russia is the only non-NATO Arctic State, and it has consistently viewed NATO as a malicious conduit for Western influence into European political mechanisms.9 An Arctic that has become more accessible for navigation opens up an opportunity for substantial NATO influence in the region. Therefore, Russian military enhancement in the High North not only ensures that Russia can maintain tactical uniformity to Western institutions, but it emphasizes Russia’s desire to strategically undermine NATO’s capabilities through military and territorial power projections. This is extremely concerning, as prioritizing force and intimidation tactics in the Arctic has the potential to ultimately shift the historically low-tension atmosphere of the Arctic into a conflict zone, bridging the gap between Russian-NATO military capabilities.

A militarized Arctic is less than ideal for not only the Arctic states, but for the wider global order as a whole. Russia’s heightened military presence reflects a broader effort to challenge an international order generally encouraged through diplomatic efforts, asserting control over territory through a military footprint that ultimately promotes a unilateral approach to Arctic governance that bypasses established norms and multilateral institutions. In a time of already unstable conditions between Russia and its European counterparts, a transition from general navigational activities in the Arctic to offensive operations would cause strenuous impacts on the region. Russia has made it extremely clear that it views NATO’s presence in the High North as a threat to strategic parity, but it should be the Arctic states best interest to ensure that the region does not become the next front for direct military confrontation.

In order to minimize the potential of Russia’s military posture allowing it to gain total superiority of the once low-tension atmosphere of the Arctic, the NATO-backed Arctic states should rely on efforts of diplomacy and mutual cooperation between all parties.2 Whether military escalation will increase to a dangerous level is entirely dependent on the steps that both Russia and the NATO-backed Arctic states take to mitigate the tensions of having two ideologically different entities inhabiting one region. If cooperation is prioritized, undermining a common contemporary theme of Russian aggression as seen in Ukraine, escalation in the Arctic will most likely be avoided. Furthermore, responding to Russia’s increased military posture in the Arctic with diplomacy rather than force would preserve regional stability while also upholding international norms, reducing the risk of heightened escalation through rule-based mechanisms in the Arctic Zone.

Cover photo: Olevs Nikers

by [Vienne Abrahamian]